who had been accused of swindling a group of investors. In overturning Estes' conviction by a 5-4 vote, the Court held that televising any aspect of a criminal trial "violates the defendant's right to a fair trial" (Beisman, 1981). The Court "specifically cited the physical intrusion of the broadcast equipment as one threat to the judicial atmosphere to which the defendant was entitled," and Justice Clark's majority opinion also found that he found the televising of trials "inherently lacking in due process" (Beisman, 1981), and most likely would have an impact on jurors, witnesses, lawyers, the judge, and the defendant (Overbeck and Pullen, 1985). While the Court did not deny courtroom access to television or radio reporters, its decision did effectively bar cameras and microphones, despite contentions that cameras and microphones are the "tools of the trade" and analogous to a print reporter's pad and pencil. In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Harlan apparently did not share the rest of the majority's view that a total ban on television was necessary (Neiman, 1981).
But the Court did leave open the possibility that "ever- advancing techniques of public communication and the adjustment of the public to its presence may bring about a change in the effect of telecasting upon the fairness of trials" (Beisman, 1981). Indeed, in the following years, vast technological progress and innovation in broadcast equipment, specifically cameras and microphones, did occur, and once again the issue of television coverage of court proceedings found its way to the Supreme Court in Chandler.
In an 8-0 decision (Justice Stevens did not participate, and Justices Stewart and White filed separate concurring opinions), the Court expanded its earlier finding in Estes, holding that "a constitutional rule barring still photographic, radio and television coverage in all cases and under all circumstances" had not been the intent of its Este...