intrinsic intentionality (p. xii).
A mistake would be to only study objectively discernable phenomenon - as if the mind were nothing more than a variation of a Skinner box. This is error that cognitive science makes. While seen as a departure from the behavioral school of psychology (which also perpetuated this same mistake), cognitive science fails to realize certain predicates in the philosophy of mind name features that are intrinsic - just as others are observer relative.
If both philosophy of mind and cognitive science have based systems on the supposition that computation is an intrinsic feature of the world, consciousness and intentionality are somewhat moot since they are observer relative, or can be folded into the general computation. Although Searle is, himself, a cognitive scientist, he instead argues that such suppositions should in fact be reversed. That is, consciousness and intentionality are "intrinsic and indelible, while computation is observer relative for the most part." (p. 51) Exceptions are the few instances where the computation is performed by a conscious mind.
In critiquing the dominant views in the philosophy of mind, Searle attempts to also overcome materialism, and to a lesser extent, dualism through a characterization of consciousness. He asks the question, "Where is consciousness in relation to the rest of the world?," and "How do we acc
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