and a messianic ideology. Most observers agree with Gaddis's retrospective evaluation of the American policy of containment of this threat: "it has, for all its contradictions, mutations, and irrationalities, been a surprisingly successful strategy" (355).
George Kennan, one of the architects of the containment policy, argued in 1947 that Soviet power would eventually cease to pose a major threat to American interests through the vigilant application "of unalterable counter-force at every point where they [the Soviets] show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world" (quoted in Gaddis 58).
Grand strategy can take the form of a perimeter or a strong point defense. The containment policy had elements of both. In a sense, the United States because of its strong economy was able to outspend the Soviets, the burden of which contributed to the eventual demise of the Soviet empire. However, Kennan and others quickly realized that America's capacity to oppose Soviet expansion and subversion was limited. American defense spending was largely focused on the achievement of an optimum nuclear deterrent force which took advantage of American superiority in high technology. High intensity confrontations generally occurred only in areas of strategic importance to the West, principally to prevent Soviet hegemony in Western Europe, its control of the great industrial base of Northeast Asia or the vast oil reserves of the Middle East and threats to the balance of power in America's sphere of interest in the Western Hemisphere. The American decision to resist militarily the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 does not fit neatly within this analysis. President Truman and his advisors believed that invasion might be the first move in a Soviet plan to attack more vital areas. Other American countermoves in more peripheral areas were generally measured. When excessive force was used to protect secondary interest...