s who explored much of the Great Lakes region and the Mississippi Basin, an effort preserved by names like Champlain and LaSalle. A profitable trade in pelts was established, and French activities in North America became an integrated part of the overall French colonial program championed by Colbert under Louis XIV (Keats 140ff). By contrast, the British American colonies were ignored and neglected, a haven of riffraff and religious zealots, which operated with virtual autonomy under general British suzerainty.
By the middle of the 18th century, Spain was no longer a major European power, and in spite of its vast colonial holdings in the New World, it was no longer an active contender in colonial expansion. At best, Spain could hope only to hold on to what it already held, and that only with difficulty. Russians were penetrating in the far northwest, but Russia could never be an important factor: The Russians had too much yet to digest in Siberia and its Far East Asian territories to expend effort on holdings so remote. The colonial stakes in North America thus fell to Britain and France.
The English colonials were too entrenched and too populous to be uprooted; in that sense, an English "cultural" position was assured. But the English colonies were effective (if very loosely) surrounded on the inland side by French holdings. The French could count on Indian support in defense of their position; the Indians had learned that French traders and missionaries were less to be feared than English settlers. Had the French won their colonial and naval struggles with Britain, it was entirely possible that they would become the dominant power in North America. The English-speaking colonies could, conceivably, have become simply a troublesome English cultural presence in a French North America--in much the same way, though on a considerably larger scale, that Quebec has become a troublesome French cultural presence in English Can...