ties to Rome that, say, a Latin city might have felt. Had Neapolis gone over, other cities might have followed, in addition to those like Capua that actually did go over. With a major seaport secured, Hannibal might have secured direct reinforcements from Carthage, or at least have opened a naval front to further stretch Rome's resources. The overall balance might have swung inexorably toward Hannibal and Carthage, and against Rome.
None of this happened, of course; the gates of Neapolis remained firmly shut, and Hannibal had to move on. Yet a decision by a handful of leading Neapolitans might have changed the outcome, with incalculable results. Thus, that Hannibal's strategy failed in the event does not prove that it was foredoomed to fail. Yet, the fact is that the gates of Neapolis did remain shut to Hannibal, in spite of all the logical reasons to open them. So did the gates of many other cities; the unavoidable implication is that the Roman alliance system had greater resilience, overall, than Hannibal had counted on. Thus the questions arise agai
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