gument, Burger makes a number of statements which comprise the fallacy of ambiguity. For example, he refers to "the interest of the public in the quality of life and the total community environment" (79), "the public safety" (79), "the right . . . to maintain a decent society" (80), and "the social interest in order and morality" (80). None of these terms are clearly defines, and yet they form an important part of Burger's legal and moral rationale for controlling obscene material.
Burger uses these terms of ambiguity because, despite their vagueness and unquantifiable nature, they nevertheless carry a suggested power which appeals to the reader's sense of morality, of what's "right," of what's "good." The fact is that the Constitution is quite clear about freedom of speech and privacy, and there is no mention in the Bill of Rights of qualifications for those freedoms, as Douglas writes in his dissent. Burger uses ambiguity because these powerful if vague words evoke in the reader the impression that there are more important things in society than protecting the freedom of speech of people who would abuse such freedoms and undermine the community and its moral---even its commercial---structure. The forces of censorship which Burger represents must resort to ambiguity because---except in rare cases---there is no effective argument against free speech.
Judge Pell, in "Collin v. Smith (1978)," argues that the attempt by the city of Skokie, Illinois, to prevent the Nazis from marching is not Constitutional. He argues that we may not like Nazis, but we cannot legally prevent them from enjoying the protection of the Bill of Rights. In making his argument, Pell commits the fallacy of neglecting relevant evidence. Specifically, he says that we cannot bar Nazis from expressing their views because "under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on...