mployers to cover 80% of their employees' health care coverage costs were scaled down in an alternative bill proposed by House Majority leader Mitchell to 50% (Lacayo, 1994, Checking Out, pp. 40-41).
Clinton then faced the problem of appearing to have reversed his position too often. Recognizing that he faced defeat if he did not compromise on many of the more controversial issues, he was forced to go along with the more moderate proposals in Mitchell's version of reform. To many of his early supporters, however, this made Clinton look as though he were really to compromise on anything in order to pass legislation. The real victory went to the initial opponents of Clinton's reform proposals, who recognized their own strength on the issue. Opponents were supported by the insurance industry and the small business lobby, which feared that Clinton's reforms would hurt small business owners (Lacayo, 1994, Checking Out, pp. 40-41; Waldman & Cohn, 1994, pp. 30-32).
The administration's decision to compromise on health care reform may have come too late to be effective. By the time the President began to make major concessions there were only a few weeks left in the Congressional session. The willingness to compromise appeared as weakness on the issue to the administration's opponents; consequently, they were content to let the congressional session expire without any movement on reform proposals. Ironically, many of Clinton's opponents on health care reform had belatedly supported his crime bill, indicating that Clinton was very weak on the more controversial issues and could not openly fight them (Waldman & Cohn, 1994, pp. 30-32).
Waldman, S. (1994, September 5). Death Rattle for Health Reform. Newsweek, pp. 30-32.
Lacayo, R. (1994, September 5). Checking Out. Time, pp. 40-41.
Lacayo, R. (1994, August 22). Down for the Count? Time, pp. 31-34.
Alter, J. (1994, August 22). The Discipline Gap. Newsweek, pp. 1...