nian analysis to "any institution: if it exists, it must be serving some function, which is the business of the sociologist to ferret out" (Collins 198).
The point here is that what appears to be a "problem" to some may very well be a desirable situation to others. In addition, this situation may very well be a natural result of the processes of society, rather than some aberration. The manifest function of society, in this specific regard, is to do away with the machine politics, but this is in conflict with the latent function, the machine politics itself, which is actually created by the needs of the "ordinary people" in that society (Collins 198).
Collins offers a critique of Merton which is not wholly justified. Collins argues that Merton's functional analysis is too accepting of the status quo, too "benign" in his analysis of the "dysfunctional" aspects of society. Collins also argues that
that Merton fails to address the conflict which is such an integral part of the contradictions between latent and manifest functions.
This criticism seems to be unduly harsh and short-sighted, simply because Merton's functional analysis should be seen as one step in the evolution of sociology. Collins himself points out that the functionalists under Merton promised to do comparative and conflict analysis which they have not done. Collins ignores the influence which Merton and the functionalists have had on the conflict analysts who followed. Collins also inadvertently acknowledges the influence of Merton's work in later research when he writes that "The functional method at its best is too vague to do more than goad one towards looking for explanations" (Collins 199). This seems the equivalent of criticizing Freud for positing his theories of behavior shaped by the unconscious (the psychological equivalent of Merton's latent functions) without explaining every aspect of that unconscious and its effects.
Merton might be fa...