03 ushered in demands for the removal of Shevardnadze. Allegations of rigged elections led to public protests by as many as 40,000 impoverished Georgians tired of endemic corruption, unpaid wages, and lack of basic utilities (Matthews & Brown, 2003). Shevardnadze saw his country in late 2003 as on the brink of civil war as opposition leader Mikhail Saakashvili called upon supporters to declare civil disobedience to the Shevardnadze regime. The problem represents tensions that have led to a showdown between Shevardnadze and Saakashvili, a pro-U.S. radical reformer who has vowed to jail Shevardnadze and mount a countrywide crackdown on corruption (Matthews & Brown, 2003).
In January 2004, Saakashvili won the presidential election in Georgia with 96 percent of the vote û replacing Shevardnadze after Shevardnadze had resigned (The people expectà, 2004). During the last 12 years of Shevardnadze's rule Georgia has come close to collapse. Wars over the near cessation of the provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have created some 300,000 refugees. Factories are abandoned, with $1.7 billion in foreign debt the country cannot pay for its Russian energy imports, and massive corruption and tax avoidance led the International Monetary Fund to suspend lending to the country in 2003. Only some $2.5 billion in American and European aid have kept the country afloat (Matthews & Brown, 2004).
In Armenia, the ousting of Shevardnadze in the Georgian "rose revolution" has introduced fears that similar revolutionary activity may occur there (Authorities set to foilà, 2003). Armenians have expressed concern that forcing Shevardnadze out of office was little more than a bloodless political coup and that the result was likely to be further regional chaos and even more economic difficult than Georgia had experienced in the past. However, the Armenian government is seen as structurally stronger and economically more solvent than Georgia's des...