eings, (Bedau, p. 177).
In the typical Pro-Choice or pro-abortion argument, it is asserted that the fetus is not a person from the moment of conception and, therefore, is not ôa rational agentö or a ôsocial being,ö (Marquis, p. 184). This argument, like the Pro-Life argument, makes two primary assumptions: 1) the truth of any of these claims is quite obvious, and 2) establishing any of these claims is sufficient to show that an abortion is not a wrongful killing, (Marquis, p. 184). One can readily see that the Pro-Life and Pro-Choice perspectives of abortion are polar opposites, revolve around the definition of when the fetus represents a ôperson,ö and seem incompatible from a moral or ethical perspective.
If we look at FeinbergÆs (p. 257) views of personhood, we see that the author believes there must be some measure or criterion that can be used to determine ôpersonhood.ö This measure or characteristic of ôpersonhoodö must be such that 1) no being can be a person unless he or she possesses that characteristic, 2) any being who possesses that characteristics is a person, and 3) it is precisely that characteristic that directly confers personhood on whoever possesses it, (Feinberg, p. 157). From FeinbergÆs definition of ôpersonhood,ö we see that Pro-Lifers and Pro-Choices u
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