in the absence of direct evidence.
At the same time, however, Osama bin Laden had eluded the Americans in Afghanistan. Shifting focus to Iraq might be challenged as a distraction from the war against terror. Nor was possible Iraqi possession of some WMD sufficient by itself to establish a presumption of eminent threat requiring military action. Thus, the domestic political case for war with Iraq could not, in the late summer of 2002, be taken as a given. Moreover, American public support appeared to be strongly contingent on international support as well -- one instance of the dovetailing noted above.
For example, Senator Arlen Specter found that when he raised the issue at a townhall meeting in Lebanon, PA, support for intervention at the head of a United Nations coalition was very strong -- about 80 percent of those in attendance -- but fell very sharply to about one-third of those in attendance for the prospect of the United States "going it alone" in Iraq (Specter, 2002). Other political observers on Capitol Hill have confirmed that this patte
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