s a great piece of spontaneous or near spontaneous television. More than that, it may be suggested that before a Republican audience in the hall, and a television public whose most interested members would be Republicans (this being during the primaries), Reagan summed up the underlying attitudes of Republican activists and voters. This audience, more affluent and therefore likely to pay higher taxes under the then existing tax structure, resented taxation. More than that, they resented paying taxes and then being ignored by the Democratic establishment. They were "paying for the microphone" of the national government, then being cut out of a chance to use it. Reagan's words struck a deep chord among them, even though the issue had nothing at all to do with governance of the nation. The overt message that Reagan gave that evening in Nashua had to do with an internal Republican campaign matter.
The implicit message had to do with a root cause of Republican voters' frustrations.
The Nashua episode was not planned by the Reagan campaign, but it could not have worked better if it had been. It worked because it allowed Reagan to play to his greatest strength: his ability to use the media to identify himself with a popular implicit message. In both 1980 and 1984, the deliberate media strategies of the Reagan campaigns were focused on doing the same thing: allowing Reagan to put forth his implicit message. This message, in essence, was that all would be well if America would only return to traditional Midwestern Republican attitudes and values.
This was most clearly visible in 1984, when the Reagan campaign was rooted firmly in a soft focus "Morning in America" theme. Gauzy images of small town Americana, winning American Olympic athletes, waving flags . . . these were the raw materials of Reagan's 1984 message and victory. Only much later did it become clear that while the implicit message was excellent for c...