Seldom indeed is the Supreme Court of the United States seen to restrain the powers of the Congress. One exception to this sad rule was seen in the case of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,1 where the Court struck down what had been termed the "legislative veto." Chadha had admitted, at a deportation hearing, that he was "deportable" under the U.S. Code, and had applied to the Attorney General for a suspension of deportation. An Immigration Judge had ordered his deportation suspended, and submitted a report of the suspension to Congress. Under 8 USC 1244(c)(2), either the House of Representatives or the Senate could, during the current or following session of Congress, by a resolution disallow the suspension. The House indeed acted unfavorably in the cases of six aliens. Chadha attacked the constitutionality of the procedure before the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals, both of whom disavowed authority. The Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit heard the case on its merits; it proved that the INS agreed with Chadha that the procedure was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the unconstitutionality of the statutory procedure.
The Court based its decision on the grounds of bicameralism, that both houses must concur, of presentment, that any congressional action must be sent also to the president, and of separation of powers, that the action was executive. However, it can be seen that the Court, in holding that the executive power had been infringed upon, was under-stating the gravity of the irregularity. The doctrine of separation of powers means, in England, that the power to tax and the power to define and punish crimes are in different branches: in these United States, in contrast, it means that all three branches (acting through different persons) must concur--the legislature proclaims a law, the judiciary tests it, and the executive may, or may not, p...