ardon the accused. The statute presumed to dispense with the concurrence of both the other branches (at least if it be accepted that the Immigration Judge and the Board of Appeals were not competent to exercise the power of judicial review.)
The procedure also was open to the objection that the very purpose of the procedure was to deprive the defendant of the rights of a citizen, i.e. it was a classical criminal trial: therefore, it was required to be heard by a jury.2
It might be added that the Court had, of course, followed the precedent set in Marbury v. Madison3 and considered the issues in the reverse order of their significance; the power to deport falls, not under the naturalization power,4 but under the power to admit, i.e. immigration, and is reserved to the States.5
White, J., dissented in Chadha on the grounds that the decision excluded any form of legislative veto, whereas the case presented a "readily indictable exemplar" of the class. The question of course arises whether the decision sheds light on the issue of veto powers in the State legislatures: in Michigan, in particular, Art. IV, Sec. 37 of the Constitution creates a legislative veto of "administrative" regulations:
The legislature may by concurrent resolution empower a joint committee of the legislature, acting between sessions, to suspend any rule or regulation promulgated by an administrative agency subsequent to the adjournment of the last preceding regular legislative session. Such suspension shall continue no longer than the end of the next regular legislative session.6
This provision offends the principle of bicameralism, since it suggests that if the two chambers disagree, the one supporting the governor prevails (rather than nothing being changed without concurrence). However, bicameralism is not a general principle throughout the States.
The question remaining is, whether the order of procedure can be reversed, with the execut...