This study will summarize six articles on international relations.
In "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," Kenneth A. Oye explains the ways that sovereign nations can agree to cooperate to reach common goals. A nation wants to keep its independence, so even when it might be in its interest to seek a desired goal by working with other nations, it might choose to follow another path just to show that it is independent. Even when a nation makes a "promise" to cooperate, it might change its position simply to remain independent and sovereign.
In international relations, there is no organization with the authority to demand that a sovereign nation cooperate with other nations. This does not mean, however, that no such cooperation takes place: "Though no international sovereign stands ready to enforce the terms of agreement, states can realize common interests through tacit cooperation, formal bilateral and multilateral negotiation, and the creation of international regimes" (1). Oye goes on to explore why cooperation takes place in some cases and not in other cases. This article is an introduction to a book of essays which take the perspective of elementary game theory and microeconomics. The areas covered are international security and economics.
There are three sections in Oye's essay: "Payoff Structures: Mutual and Conflicting Preference"; "Shadow of the Future: Single-play and Iterated Games"; and "Number of Players: Two-Person and N-Person Games." In the first section, Oye explores a number of game theory approaches which are useful in understanding why nations cooperate. Such games as Prisoners' Dilemma and Stag Hunt "have attracted a disproportionate share of scholarly attention precisely because cooperation is desirable but not automatic" (6). In many cases, "the capacity of states to cooperate under anarchy . . . is vital to the realization of a common good" (6).
Oye points out that in ma...