ny cases cooperation is not necessary simply because individual states reach a common goal simply by seeking their own interests. In other cases, cooperation will not secure common interests and, therefore, states have no "payoff" to cooperate.
In some cases, a nation will cooperate even though it does not gain something, because to not cooperate (to "defect") does not bring any gain itself. The nation has nothing to lose by cooperating, and nothing to gain by defecting. It cooperates because it will be seen as cooperative without losing anything.
Oye then examines a number of specific games and how they are useful in understanding how payoff structures bring about cooperation. For example,
under iterated condition, the magnitude of differences among payoffs within a given class of games can be an important determinant of cooperation. The more substantial the gains from mutual cooperation and the less substantial the gains from unilateral defection, the greater the likelihood of cooperation (9).
Oye then examines ways in which nations can change the payoff structure in order to convince other nations to cooperate for the mutual gain of all nations involved. For example, an agreement might be reached in secret between two nations, but one nation might fear that the other nation will defect from the agreement. In such a case, "Publicizing [the] agreement diminishes payoffs associated with defection from the agreement, and thereby lessens gains from exploitation" (10). A nation must be careful that it does not make itself vulnerable by changing the payoff structure:
"In many instances, unilateral actions that limit one's gain from exploitation may have the effect of increasing one's vulnerability to exploitation by others. . . . A state could limit gains from liberal international economic norms by permitting the expansion of sectors of comparative advantage. . . . This strategy would . . . increase the credibility of the n...