This research examines the crisis management practiced by the Kennedy Administration during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. While the emphasis in this research is on the Administration's crisis management, it is also necessary to consider the issue of Soviet missiles in Cuba for reasons other than the obvious: the issue created the situation wherein crisis management was required. Among some analysts and historians, however, there are doubts that the presence of the Soviet missiles in Cuba increased significantly the Soviet threat to United States (US) national security (Fitzsimmons, 1969; Walton, 1972). Many of these analysts and historians tend to think that the Kennedy Administration felt compelled to treat the issue as a crisis, and to appear, at least to come out of it a winner, because of the severe loss of credibility suffered by the Administration--both domestically and internationally--as a consequence of the Bay of Pigs fiasco (Medland, 1988). Thus, the management of the crisis involving Soviet missiles in Cuba must be examined both narrowly in the context of the missile issue per se, and more broadly with respect to both (1) the range of international issues in which the Kennedy Administration was involved, and (2) domestic political imperatives faced by the Administration in the fall of 1962.
First and foremost was the issue of Soviet missiles in Cuba. On Monday, 15 October, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) photo-analysis of U-2 film confirmed the installation in progress of launching pads for medium- and intermediate-range missiles (Pachter, 1963). The CIA thinks that support material began to arrive in Cuba in early-September, with missiles arriving somewhat later (Pachter, 1963).
Medium-range Soviet missiles in Cuba did not constitute a threat to the US. The Administration, however, felt that longrange Soviet missiles in Cuba did pose a threat to American cities, although very "few American experts . ....