. feared" that the Soviets would threaten American cities (Pachter, 1963, p. 7). Although the Kennedy Administration claimed that Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Cuba were capable of destroying every ma]or city in the United States, most informed opinion simply did not agree (Pachter, 1963). Even Aviation Week (1962), a periodical strongly supportive of national defense issues, stated that the Soviet missiles should be called not IRBMs (intermediate-range ballistic missiles), but PRBMs (political-range ballistic missiles). President Kennedy (1962, p. 898), however, said that the missiles "would have appeared to" change the strategic balance, and that "appearances contribute to reality."
Domestic politics in the US also provided an issue during the Cuban missile crisis. The press and the Republicans in Congress were, in September 1962, accusing President Kennedy of inaction and indifference in the face of a Soviet military build-up near to the US (Pachter, 1963). With mid-term congressional elections coming up in November, the President, as leader of the Democratic Party, could not appear to be unwilling to oppose Soviet military action on America's doorstep (Pachter, 1963).
International issues played an even larger role in the development of the Cuban missile crisis. The major international issues which the Administration was addressing, in addition to the Cuban missile crisis, were as follows:
1. Laos: The Administration was attempting to obtain a cease fire in Laos. President Kennedy was resisting an international conference on Laos, as suggested by the Soviets, until a cease fire was in place (Rostow, 1964).
2. Berlin: The Soviets were pressuring the United States on Berlin. Khruschev issued an ultimatum, in which the Soviet intention of granting full recognition to the German Democratic Republic (GDR), or East Germany, was outlined (Rostow, 1964). This issue was of exceptional significance, because of...