lus of social interests" (Rawls, 1971, p. 28). Indeed, in the utilitarian conceptualization, even a social norm of slavery is not inconceivable, if slavery is interpreted as necessary for "the greatest average happiness."
In a contractarian theory of social structure that underpins the theory of justice as fairness, the assumption is that order is achieved via a confluence of interests predicated of debate and agreement. This leads to what Rawls terms the "original position," wherein a hypothetical set of individuals who assembled to construct a society would have an equal voice in how the society would be organized. Where the voices are unequal (and in the real world of course they are unequal), it is impossible to agree to be the silent voice.
We cannot have it both ways: we cannot interpret the theory of justice hypothetically when the appropriate occasions of consent cannot be found to explain individuals' duties and obligations, and then insist upon real situations of risk-bearing to throw out principles of justice that we do not
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