th a new and very different set of players in Moscow.
A major point of disagreement between President Clinton and his U.S. critics concerns the U.S. support for President Yeltsin (Zelikow, 1994). Critics charge that the Clinton Administration's continued unquestioning support for Boris Yeltsin makes less and less sense. According to critics, Yeltsin today is presiding over the return of the hard-line Soviet nomenklatura to top positions of power. He has lost the support of the Russian reformers and is pursuing an increasingly confrontational foreign policy.
Anti-Western sentiments are growing in Russia. Moscow is attempting to re-establish its influence in neighboring regions that once were part of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin is employing economic, diplomatic, and military means to achieve a sphere of economic and military influence in what Moscow calls its "near abroad:" the Baltic States, Ukraine, and the non-Russian states in Central Asia and the Caucasus that used to be part of the Soviet Union but became independent when it collapsed (Starr, 1996).
President Clinton's critics believe that preventing the emergence of a Russian empire in the lands of the former Soviet Union should be a top Western priority, both to help assure the development and survival of Russian democracy and to safeguard vital Western interests. Moreover, an anti-Western policy could lead Russia to forge alliances with anti-Western forces in Iran, Iraq, China, and Libya. Yet, critics allege, the Clinton Administration has given the Russians a free ride in the "near abroad" (Brzezynski, 1995).
Critics of the Clinton Administration also claim that the U.S. has turned a blind eye to the atrocities in Chechnya. The President and his aides have bent over backwards not to offend President Yeltsin as he has crushed the rebellion, which so far has resulted in over 30,000 deaths and more than 300,000 refugees (Starr, 1996).
A critical concern ...