to one person, which is what Locke seems to be saying, though he admits that such languages are possible, as when an individual uses a code known only to himself to keep a diary. Ayer also admits that his definition of a private language is not the one philosophers generally use:
What philosophers usually seem to have in mind when they speak of a private language is one that is, in their view, necessarily private, in as much as it is used by some particular person to refer only to his own private experiences: for it is often held that for a language to be public it must refer to what is publicly observable. . . (Ayer 449).
Ayer refers to the view of private language taken by Wittgenstein and notes that the latter seems to mean by this that someone who attempted to use language in a private way, so that his utterances would refer only to his private experiences, and so that these things would have a different meaning for him than for anybody else, would not only be unable to communicate his meaning to others but would in fact have no meaning to communicate to himself (Ayer 450).
Wittgenstein writes of this issue in his Philosophical Investigations and begins the issue with section 243. He notes there that a human being might encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame, and even punish himself. He could even ask himself a question and answer it. It is possible to imagine a person who speaks to himself constantly in a running monologue, and we can imagine an explorer listening to such a person and deciphering what these people are saying, translating it from their language into ours:
But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences--his feelings, moods, and the rest--for his private use?--Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language?--But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to...