Iraq gave strong indications before the invasion that it would use force, if necessary, to resolve its differences with Kuwait. In retrospect, it is clear that American efforts to dissuade or deter Iraq from such a course were ineffective. Stiles says that there was "a serious lapse of military and diplomatic intelligence" (140). The United States through satellite reconnaissance and other means had ample warning. Discussions between Saddam Hussein and April Glaspie, the American ambassador in Iraq, were ambiguous at best. They violated the first rule of an effective policy of deterrence, namely, that any threat to an opponent must be "credible and sufficiently potent in the eyes of the aggressor to prevent him from attempting the undesired course of action" (Craig 190). The United States (and others such as Egypt's Hosni Mubarak) misread Saddam's intentions at that time.
The United States, however, did quickly recognize that Iraq was threatening its
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