This research examines the application of strategic bomb ing by the Allied Forces against Germany in the Second World War. The focus of this research is expressed in the following question: Could a more effective application of strategic bomb ing by the Allied Forces against Germany in the Second World War have obviated the need for the Allied land invasion of Europe? American Army Air Corps General Carl Spaatz was one senior Allied air officer who thought that the answer to this question was affirmative (Craven and Cate, 1951, p. 26). General Hap Arnold (1949, p. 3), also of American Army Air Corps, shared this view.
Some of the reasons cited for the failure of the strategic bombing offensive to preclude the need for an Allied land inva sion of Europe are (1) poor command unity of the Allied stra tegic bomber force in Europe, (2) conflicting strategic objec tives in application of the Allied strategic bomber force in Europe and North Africa, (3) according political objectives priority over strategic objectives in the application of the Allied strategic bomber force against Germany, (4) poor target ing in the application of the Allied strategic bomber force against Germany, (5) poor concentration of the resources in the application of the Allied strategic bomber force against Ger many, and (6) a failure to exploit the defeat of the Luftwaffe subsequent to mid year 1944, in the application of the Allied bomber force against Germany. These contentions are based upon claims that (1) either the Allied strategic bombing campaign against Germany was ineffective or, at least, was less effec tive than it could have been, and that (2) superior results to those attained in Europe through the application of the Allied strategic bomber force were achieved in the application of the strategic bomber force against Japan.
The findings of the investigation of the research question stated above are presented in discussions related to the eig...