Allied Forces Strategic Bombing Against Germany
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This research examines the application of strategic bombing by the Allied Forces against Germany in the Second World War. The focus of this research is expressed in the following question: Could a more effective application of strategic bombing by the Allied Forces against Germany in the Second World War have obviated the need for the Allied land invasion of Europe? American Army Air Corps General Carl Spaatz was one senior Allied air officer who thought that the answer to this question was affirmative (Craven and Cate, 1951, p. 26). General Hap Arnold (1949, p. 3), also of American Army Air Corps, shared this view.Some of the reasons cited for the failure of the strategic bombing offensive to preclude the need for an Allied land invasion of Europe are (1) poor command unity of the Allied strategic bomber force in Europe, (2) conflicting strategic objectives in application of the Allied strategic bomber force in Europe and North Africa, (3) according political objectives priority over strategic objectives in the application of the Allied strategic bomber force against Germany, (4) poor targeting in the application of the Allied strategic bomber force against Germany, (5) poor concentration of the resources in the application of the Allied strategic bomber force against Germany, and (6) a failure to exploit the defeat of the Luftwaffe subsequent to midyear 1944, in the application of the Allied bomber force against Germany. These contentions are ba
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occurred (Taylor, 1978, pp. xvxxi). Of course, the Germans acknowledge their bombing raids over southern England, and the consequent air combat between the Royal Air Force and the Luftwaffe during the relevant time period. What they do not accept is the British attribution of German military objectives associated with that activity, and the British assessment of the significance of that activity (Deighton, 1978, p. 12). Lastly, the most senior members of the British air staff at the time were in almost total disagreement with the manner in which the Battle of Britain was waged, and wasted little time once it was over in giving the boot to the manAir Chief Marshall Sir Hugh Dowding most responsible for British success in the Battle (Wright, 1969, p. 11).
In spite of its relatively short duration, the failure of the Germans to acknowledge either its decisiveness or their intent in it, and the eagerness of the British senior air staff to dismiss (or, at least, to obfuscate) its implications for the use and value of air power, the Battle of Britain is viewed by many historians as a decisive battle (Mason, 1969, p. 6; Taylor, 1967, p. 201), and as a turning point in the Second World War (Markl, 1984, p. 102; Taylor, 1967, p.
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Some common words found in the essay are:
Battle Britain, Fighter Command, Craven Cate, North Africa, Albert Speer, Luftwaffe Speer, North African, WITHTHOSE JAPAN, Air Corps, strategic bomber, England Luftwaffe, battle britain, bomber force, allied strategic, allied strategic bomber, strategic bomber force, bomber resources, fighter command, strategic bomber resources, craven cate, world war, air staff, andrews 1970, craven cate 1951, application allied strategic,
Approximate Word count = 4743
Approximate Pages = 19 (250 words per page)
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