ht points identified. The six reasons cited for the failure of the strategic bombing offensive to preclude the need for an Allied land invasion of Europe, together with the two claims upon which these reasons are based, are each addressed in dis cussions which, in some instances, combine one or more of the reasons and claims.
POOR COMMAND UNITY OF THE ALLIED STRATEGIC BOMBER
FORCE IN EUROPE, CONFLICTING STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN THE APPLICATION OF THE STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCE,AND ACCORDING POLITICAL OBJECTIVES PRIORITY OVERSTRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN THE APPLICATION OF THESTRATEGIC BOMBER FORCE AGAINST GERMANY
Both the British Royal Air Force and the United States Army Air Corps envisioned that strategic bomber forces would be used to operate an independent offensive independent of land and sea offenses (Andrews, 1970, p. 189; Craven and Cate, 1951, p. 6). The independence of the strategic bomber command was compromised from the very beginning of the war, however, by the urgent needs of support for land forces, and by the inability of the Allied air forces to establish air superiority over the Luftwaffe (Craven and Cates, 1951, pp. 319 344). As a consequence, in the beginning, the resources of the strategic bomber force were not concentrated in a single, coordinated air offensive, and decision concerning the application of these resources were often made by others than strategic bomber force commanders (Craven and Cate, 1951, pp. 319 344). In this instance, at least, however, the American and British strategic bomber force commanders were unified in their opposition to the application of strategic bomber force resources. On the Ameri can side, the strategic bomber resources available for European operations were severely curtailed by the necessity to divert such resources to the operations in the Pacific in 1942 (Andrews, 1970, p. 196).
What the Americans in particular objected to as the war progressed, however, was t...