hat the British and American strate gic bomber forces were subject to a unified command under the Combined Bomber Offensive (Craven and Cate, 1951, pp. 101 102). American dissatisfaction in this instance stemmed from the facts that (1) British and American strategic air staffs held different conceptions of how the strategic bomber offensive should be conducted, and that (2) the British strategic air staff positions, through Prime Minister Churchill's influence with President Roosevelt, were able to prevail most often (Craven and Cate, 1951, pp. 101 102, 319 344; Andrews, 1970, pp. 191 192). As a consequence, the American strategic bomber force command supported initiatives to place strategic bomber resources under the direct command of the European Theatre of Operations, because its commander Dwight Eisenhower was an American (Craven and Cate, 1949, p. 213). While it is true that Allied strategic bomber resources were not applied in the early stages of the war as had been envisioned prior to the beginning of the war
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