portant, it is important to understand that no strategic postwar (i.e., post-Crusade) plans had been particularly made by Urban II when he called the First Crusade. Although Frankish forces comprised a significant part of the military force, the Crusade was called in the name of all Christians. Beeler cites the military abilities of the Frankish commanders in Syria, who made use of "archers, crossbowmen, and engineers [who] were always in demand [for] . . . a tactical system in which the infantry played an essential role" (Beeler, 1971, p. 248).
But there was no particular strategic coordination of crusader forces. After the Christians retook Jerusalem f rom the Moslem forces in 1099, a great vacuum of political power was evident in Jerusalem. Into this vacuum stepped a host of Frankish nobility who carved out for themselves petty European-style principalities in the Holy Land. But the clash of cultures proved decisive for long-term military purposes, as Beeler points out:
Although the Frankish conquests in the Levant bear a superficial resemblance to the earlier Norman conquests in Italy and England, there were significant differences. In both Italy and England traditions and institutions existed which the conquerors were able to adapt to their own purposes. With the exception of certain fiscal procedures, there were no native institutions in the east which could readily be adapted to Frankish needs (Beeler, 1971, pp. 120-2).
The good military news for the Europeans was that the Moslem states were fragmented for many years. The bad military news was that the Europeans did not use the period of fragmentation to really institutionalize European presence in the Holy Land. As occupiers of the region, they tried to establish Christian states but did not really succeed over the long term; they were subject to attack from hostile forces on all sides. That is why Beeler says that the "Principal weakness of the Christian st...