court will not avoid the responsibility of such interpretation, occasioned by what has proved to be the determination of of nonjudicial government entities to flout their responsibilities while asserting judicial and extralegal authority from the time the first disputes in this case arose.
The Court's earlier ruling that the military emergency does not give the president power to require a state to revoke a contract on one hand or to create military tribunals that interfere with functioning civil courts on the other is reaffirmed. When in Gibbons v. Ogden the Court held that it was the right and duty of Congress to regulate all forms of commerce, not the states, by no means was it either expressed or implied that government entities at or below the federal level could unilaterally abrogate a contract. After Ex Parte Millligan (O'Brien 248), there is no constitutional authority for the president to construct military tribunals with civil-court authority. Indeed, the facts of the case are that the only civil authority that had collapsed in New York City was that of the dilatory NYPD vis-a-vis Nogaine resident aliens; the courts were not imperiled at any time.
Were the court not to reaffirm the earlier ruling, contract law itself would be destabilized, subject to political caprice or vicissitudes of unpredictable experience. Were the Court's earlier ruling not to stand, the entire civil structure of the society could be hostage to the demands of any with sinister designs. What for example could be the response if Klingon resident aliens demanded tribute as a condition of doing business on this planet and threatened earthly invasion if the tribute were unpaid? If Klingon and Nogaine interests (for example) conflicted vis-a-vis our country's policy, we would be placed in an impossibly chaotic constitutional and governance position, a consequence of executive interference in what must always be a judicial function, where interpretation...