ea of a contriver" (Hume 65), behind it. Therefore, by analogy:
6. There must exist a rational intelligence in the universe. Or, as Cleanthes puts it: "The most obvious conclusion surely is in favour of design" (Hume 65).
The core of Philo's refutation of the argument from design can be discerned in his restatement of the principle that order of the universe implies a rational intelligence. This appears to be behind his statement that "similar causes prove similar effects, and similar effects similar causes" (Hume 57) means that if there is effect or manifestation of order and intelligence, then such order must have been designed. That summing-up of the argument from design (i.e., teleological argument), for the existence of God is made only as the basis for his protracted refutation of its sense. "For aught we know a priori . . . there is no more difficulty in conceiving that the several elements, from an internal unknown cause, may fall into that arrangement" (Hume 56). Therefore, in the first place, the design argument cannot be proved by the component parts of Cleanthes's arguments; its conclusion can at most be inferred.
This whole line of thought suggests that Hume is arguing for randomness as the distinctive feature of the universe that has a rational equivalence of probability with the notion of divine design as its distinctive feature. The point is that inferring that any intelligence is the source of the creative principle in the universe is a misdirection of the rational faculty, or more exactly a product of the uniquely human rational faculty. His position is that specific individual causes, but not one grand-design cause, can be accounted for, except by processes of the mind.
Further, Philo notes "with what extreme caution all just reasoners proceed in the transferring of experiments to similar cases. Unless the cases be exactly similar, they repose no perfect confidence in applying their past observation to any...