ch watched their profitability suffer as they were denied entry into other sectors of the economy.
Commercial banks, insurance companies, and securities firms, which had been pushing for Glass-Steagall's repeal since the 1970s, intensified that effort. A lucrative world beckoned if they could tear down the walls of Glass-Steagall and build financial services firms offering one-stop shopping. So lucrative that they spent $300 million lobbying Congress, the most expensive lobbying campaign ever (Scheer, 1999, p. B7). The banks believed that they had to secure this legislation or they ôwere going to disappearö (Brinkley, 1999, p. A1).
Only consumer advocacy groups arrayed against bank reform, at least for the long haul. Ralph Nader, head of Public Citizen summarized his group's opposition in testimony before Congress on February 11, 1999. He argued that the repeal of Glass-Steagall would lead to the formation of corporate combinations ôwhich will dominate the delivery of financial products and fuel the already alarming trend toward mega mergers and the concentration of economic powerö (Nader, 1999). Edmund Mierzwinski from the Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) echoed Nader's sentiments, arguing that the ôone-stopö shopping pushed by banks would lead to higher fees, less privacy, and less choice for consumers (Mierzwinski, 1999).
Slowly but surely, bank lobbyists managed to craft the issue as one of leveling the playing field. Fairness dictated that banks be allowed to compete in the same way as other businesses. Nader countered that banks served a unique role as guarantors of America's financial security and as such, the government must hold banks to different standards (Nader, 1999). But as the economy expanded and changed during the 1990s, the notion of banks as unique receded as our confidence in our ability to ma
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