The cognitive theory of emotion comes under fire in Cheshire CalhounÆs Cognitive Emotions? In this essay, Calhoun (p. 239) maintains that cognitive theories of emotion that are based on a connection between emotion and ôrelevant beliefsö are invalid. Calhoun (p. 237) discusses two kinds of cognitivism that he undermines, ôpatchworkö and ôunityö accounts. In both of these accounts, the author argues that beliefs are associated with many other concepts, from feelings and assessment to behavior and desires. Patchwork accounts are either ôlogico-linguisticö or ôontologicalö (Calhoun, p. 237). The logico-linguistic account views beliefs as partial components of emotion and that ôascriptions of emotions entail ascriptions of certain sorts of beliefs (Solomon, p. 237). Ontological accounts go even further by proclaiming that ôbeliefs are ingredients of emotionö (Calhoun, p. 237).
Unity theories of cognitive emotion do not try to deconstruct emotion into non-emotion elements, but they do maintain that beliefs take on uniquely emotional qualities. Even so, Calhoun claims that the unity theory radically transforms the concept of belief. As the author exclaims, ôHow can a physiological disturbance be a belief? Are not these, logically and ontologically, distinct categories?ö (Calhoun, p. 238). In short, patchwork theories of emotion reject the idea that emotional beliefs are any different than any other kind of belief. Neither of these theories is able to ôbridge the conceptual gulfö between the nature of emotion and belief, in CalhounÆs (p. 239). Even if they could resolve the vulnerability of the conceptual gap problem, neither of these theories can hold up in light of the conflict theory. The conflict theory occurs when our emotions are in conflict with the beliefs we express or hold. We can only assume this is not the case if we make cognitive emotion an a prior or unchallengeable concept, something Calho...