e majority is in favor of one man the authorities cannot resist their wish (quoted in Abrahamian, 1982, p. 21).
Another 19th century British observer noted succinctly that "local rulers are often given orders which they can not execute" (quoted in Abrahamian, 1982, p. 39).
In the course of the century, however, the West began to impinge significantly on Iran. Iran was too far away from Western centers of power, and two equidistant between Britain and Russia -- in terms of power projection, if not geography -- to be colonized outright, in spite of the Qajar's inability to build a modern state or specifically a modern army. However, Western ideas came in, and a significant number of Iranians obtained a Western education. This education gave them technical skills that made them influential out of proportion to their numbers. Even more consequentially, they learned a new Western vocabulary of politics by which to express and analyze the political condition of their own society.
Ironically, but not coincidentally, this emergence of a Westernized element in Iran went hand in hand alongside a rise in popular anti-Westernism. Early 19th century Western travelers had found themselves welcomed, and one missionary was even invited to debate local mullahs. However, "by the end of the century, Western visitors considered xenophobia and religious fanaticism to be ingrained aspects of popular culture in Iran. In fact, they were mostly recent and ironic byproducts of the Western impact on Iran" (Abrahamian, 1982, pp. 72-73). The image is strikingly reminiscent of what Western television viewers saw during the 1978-79 revolution.
It was in fact Western imperialism, more than "Westernization," as such, that drove the hostility that these largely British visitors felt. Americans found themselves much more welcome in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and indeed for decades yet to come. The readiness of Iranians to distingu...