gh experimentation, I believe Kuhn’s views of paradigms are not in need of alteration. He admits that science is continuously evolving in a manner similar to the state, whereby, the shifting from normal science to crisis to scientific revolution back to a period of stability (or normal science) mirrors the progression from the stable social/state regime to a period of crisis to revolution followed by another stable social/state regime. Further, Kuhn accepts that paradigms are incommensurable to other paradigms or competing theories in the sense that “…proponents of competing paradigms must fail to make complete contact with each other’s viewpoints” (Kuhn 147). Because of differences in values, changes in meaning and ontological change Kuhn argues that paradigms are incommensurable. For example, Kuhn believes ontological change adds to the incommensurability of paradigms because different disciplines exist in different worlds from each other, “…proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds. One contains constrained bodies that move slowly, the other pendulums that repeat their motions again and again. In one, solutions are compounds, in the other mixtures. One is embedded in a flat, the other in a curved, matrix of space” (Kuhn 149). Thus, different scientific communities often have different realities to which their paradigms refer.
(a) Within his description of science and scientific change, Kuhn introduces elements of both a sociological and intellectual nature. Because the very nature of a scientific community refers to a shared communication among members, there are obviously sociological factors that impact the science and scientific progress emanating from them. For example, different scientific communities share symbolic generalizations among members, like E=mc2. These symbolic generalizations are taken for granted as truth by members of the community. There are also...